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[L. A. No. 25494. In Bank. July 20, 1961.]

THEODORE R. GABRIELSON, Petitioner and Appellant, v.
CITY OF LONG BEACH, Defendant and Respondent;
PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, Intervener and Respondent.·
[1] Oosts-Attorneys' Fees-Fund Preserved for Benefit of Other
Persons.-The bases of the equitable rule which permits surcharging a common fund with the expenses of its protection
or recovery, including counsel fees, are fairness to the successfullitigant, who might otherwise receive no benefit because
his recovery might be consumed by the expenses; correlative
prevention of unfair advantage to others who are entitled
to share in the fund and who should bear their share of the
burden of its recovery; and encouragement of the attorney
for the successful litigant, who will be more willing to undertake and diligently prosecute proper litigation for protection
or recovery of the fund if he is assured that he will be
promptly and directly compensated should his dorts be successful. These considerations are not apposite, however, if
the attorney's and his client's ultimate objective is not to secure or preserve a common fund but to establish personal
adverse interests therein; in such a case fees must not be
awarded.
[2] ld.-Attorneys' Fees-Fund Preserved for Benefit of Other
Persons.-To allow attorney's fees in a case where the attorney's ultimate objective is to establish personal interests in
a common fund merely because the attorney's services have
benefited the class to whom the fund belonged would place his
interests in conflict with those of his client; an attorney retained to recover or protect a common fund so that it would
be available when and if his client could establish an adverse
right thereto might be induced to forsake his client's interest
in the hope of securing more substantial fees from the common
fund.
[8] ld.-Attorneys' Fees-Fund Preserved for Benefit of Other
Persons.-In a proceeding by an attorney against a city for
attorney's fees for establishing the state's right to tideland
oil and gas revenues declared by statute to be free from

[lJ Allowance of attorney's fees against property or fund increased or protected by attorney's services, notes, 49 A.L.R. 1149;
107 A.L.R. 749. See also Oal.Jur.2d, Costs, § 36 et seq.; Am.Jur.,
Costs, § 63 et seq.
Mclt. Dig. Reference: [l-5J Costs, § 32.
-Thia case waa originally entitled, "Mallon v. City of Lone Beach!'
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public trust for navigation, commerce and fisheries (Stats.
1951, ch. 915, pp. 2444, 2445), wherein the city claimed as
trustee and the state intervened as beneficiary of the resulting
trust, the trial court could reasonably infer that the ultimate
objective of the attoruey and his client was to deprive the
city and state of all title and interest in oil and gas contained
in the city's submerged lands covered by federal leasing
applications held by certain corporations and to establish the
corporations' ownership of the oil and gas revenues therefrom
where there was evidence that the client and the corporations
had filed such applications, that the client had transferred
her application to one of these corporations, that the attorney
purchased shares of stock in one corporation and receive!l
shares of another corporation, apparently for services rendered
the client, and became an officer of both corporations, and
that he was aware of the federal leasing applications and of
litigation unsuccessfully brought in the federal courts to compel the Secretary of Interior to grant such applications.
[4] Id.-Attomeys' Fees-Fund Preserved for Benefit of Other
Persons.-In a proceeding by an attorney against a city for
attorney's fees for establishing the state's right to tideland
oil and gas revenues declared by statute to be free from public
trust for navigation, commerce and fisheries (Stats. 1951, ch.
915, pp. 2444, 2445), wherein the city claimed as .trustee and
the state intervened as beneficiary of the resulting trust,
though there was evidence other than evidence from which
it could be inferred that the attorney and his client were
seeking to establish personal interests in the oil and gas
revenues and that this other evidence would support a finding
that the attorney and his client had abandoned federal leasing
claims to the submerged mineral resources and had entered a
prior state case solely for the purpose of insuring that the
oil and gas revenue should be lawfully expended, it was for
the trial court to resolve conflicting inferences and determine
the weight to be given the attorney's disclaimer of adverse
interest.
[6] Id.-Attorneys' Fees-Fund Preserved for Benefit of Other
Persons.-In a proceeding by an attorney against a city for
attorney's fees for establishing the state's right to tideland
oil and gas revenues declared by statute to be free from public
trust for navigation, commerce and fisheries (Stats. 1951, ch.
915, pp. 2444, 2445), wherein the city claimed as trustee and
the state intervened as beneficiary of the resulting trust, it
was not prejudicial error to exclude evidence of the attorney's
services before a committee of the Legislature in working
out legislation to settle the controversy that arose between
the eity and the state after a decision of the state Supreme .
Court holding that the statute was a valid partial revocation:
j
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of the trust that necessarily resulted in a reversion to the
state of the released revenues which the city held on a resulting trust for the state, where in excluding this evidence
the trial court was primarily concerned with the extent of
services for which fees could be awarded if the right to fees
was established, the attorney did not point out the relevance
of the evidence to the issue of his motive, and there was
abundant evidence that the attorney continued to champion the
state's interest in the prior Supreme Court case, and evidence
of similar activity before the Legislature would have been
largely cumulative.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. A. Curtis Smith, Judge. Affirmed.
Proceeding by an attorney against a city for attorney's
fees for establishing the state's right to tideland oil and gas
revenues declared by statute to be free from public trust for
navigation, commerce and fisheries. Judgment denying petition, affirmed.
John W. Preston, John W. Preston, Jr., S. V. O. Pritchard
and Peter E. Giannini for Petitioner and Appellant.
Gerald Desmond and Walhfred Jacobson, City Attorneys,
O'Melveny & Myers and Pierce Works for Defendant and
Respondent.
Stanley Mosk, Attorney General, Howard S. Goldin, Assistant Attorney General, and Jay L. Shavelson, Deputy Attorney
General, for Intervener and Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-In 1911 the State of California granted
to the city of Long Beach the tidelands and submerged lands
lying within the city's boundaries in trust for certain uses
and purposes connected with the development of Long Beach
Harbor. (Stats. 1911, ch. 676, p. 1304.) The terms of the
original trust were amended by the Legislature in 1925 (Stats.
1925, ch. 102, pp. 235-236) and 1935 (Stats. 1935, ch. 158,
pp. 793-795). Following the discovery of oil under the tidelands in 1937, it was determined in Oity of Long Beach v.
Marshall, 11 Ca1.2d 609 [82 P.2d 362], that the city had
the right to produce oil and gas from these lands, and in
Oity of Long Beach v. Morse, 31 Ca1.2d 254 [188 P.2d 17],
and Trickey v. Oity of LO'llg Beach, 101 Cal.App.2d 871 [226
P.2d 694], that the oil and gas revenue could be used only
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for trust purposes. In 1951 the Legislature found that 50
percent of the revenue derived from the produdion of oil,
gas, and other hydrocarbons other than dry gas and all of
the revenue derived from the production of dry gas were no
longer· needed for trust purposes and declared such revenues
frec from the public trust for navigation, commerce, and
fisheries. (Stats. 1951, ch. 915, pp. 2444-2445.)
The city claimed the released revenues and undertook to
expend them for general municipal purposes. Felix Mallon,
a taxpayer of the city, then brought an action to enjoin the
city from expending the released revenues other than drygas revenues for other than trust purposes on the ground
that the 1951 statute releasing the revenues from the trust
was unconstitutional. Mrs. Alma Swart, another taxpayer
of the city, intervened. Through her attorney, Theodore R.
Gabrielson, she alleged that Mallon was prosecuting a friendly
suit and that he had failed to raisc the question of the unlawful expenditure of dry-gas revenues and other important
legal and constitutional issues. She sought to enjoin the
expenditure of any of the released revenues for other than
trust pUrPoses. Although she joined in Mallon's attack on the
constitutionality of the 1951 statute, she also contended that if
the statute were to be held constitutional, it would be necessary to interpret it as releasing the oil and gas revenues to
the state rather than to the city.
The trial court held that the statute released the revenue
to the city and entered judgment for it. Both Mallon and
Mrs. Swart appealed. Although she agreed with Mallon's
contention that the Legislature could not constitutionally release the revenues to the city, Mrs. Swart also presented the
contention, accepted by the court, that the statute was a
valid partial revocation of the trust that necessarily resulted
in a reversion to the state of the released revenues, which
the city held upon a resulting trust for the state. (Mallon
v. Oity of LO'llg Beach, 44 Ca1.2d 199, 212 [282 P.2d 481].)
Although the attorney general was aware of this litigation,
he took no part in it until after the decision of this court,
when he filed an amicus curiae brief urging that a rehearing
be denied. Thereafter the state brought an action against
the city to recover the funds to which it was entitled under
the decision in the Mallon case. In 1956 the Legislature took
note of this litigation and concluded that the public interest
would best be served by its prompt settlement. Accordingly,
it authorized a settlement dividing the oil and gas revenue
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between the state and the city and provided that the latter's
share should continue to be held in trust and expended for
trust purposes. (Stats. 1st Ex. Sess. 1956, ch. 29.) Pursuant
to this legislation a consent decree was entered settling the
main points of dispute between the city and the state.
On March 27, 1956, petitioner Gabrielson filed a petition
in the Mallon case for attorney's fees for establishing the
state's right to the released revenues. The city resisted his
application as trustee and the state intervened as beneficiary
of the resulting trust. Following an extended hearing, the
trial court entered its judgment denying an award of attorney's fees. Petitioner appeals.
Petitioner contends that his legal e1iorts as attorney for
Mrs. Swart secured for the state oil and gas revenues stipulated to be worth $200,000,000 and that therefore he is entitled
to reasonable attorney's fees from this fund. He points out
that the attorney general and other state officials shared the
view that the Legislature intended to release the surplus
oil and gas revenues to the city and took no action to protect
the state's right thereto until after he had successfully represented the state's interest before this court.
Although petitioner seeks fees from funds in the hands of
the city as trustee, the city and state contend that his suit
is nevertheless an action against the state to which it has
not consented. They also contend that petitioner is not entitled to attorney's fees on the ground that he abandoned
the interests of the city taxpayers he purported to represcnt
when he advanced the state's interest against those taxpayers.
Finally they assert that petitioner was properly denied fees
on the ground that both his and Mrs. Swart's purpose in
intervening was to defeat both the state's and city's interests
by tying up the revenues in litigation until they could establish personal interests therein under federal mineral leasing applications.
Before this proceeding was tried, the city and state unsuccessfully sought a writ of prohibition in the District Court
of Appeal, and a hearing was denied in this court. Petitioner
contends that the denial of the application for the writ, even
though no opinion was filed, is res judicata with respect to
the defense of sovereign immunity and that in any event
that defense is not applicable in this case. He also asserts
that he did not abandon the interests of the city taxpayers
on whose behalf he intervened. He points out that it is always
to the taxpayers' interest that money not be spent illegally,
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and that given the determination that the oil and gas revenues could not constitutionally be released to the city, it was
to the city taxpayers' interest as citizens of the state that
the money be released to the state instead of being accumulated for trust purposes for which it could not economically
be expended. Finally he contends that there is no evidence
to support the trial court's findings that he and Mrs. Swart
were endeavoring to secure the revenues for themselves.
[1] In Estate of Stauffer, 53 Cal2d 124, 132 [346 P.2d
748], we stated: "The bases of the equitable rule which
permits surcharging a common fund with the expenses of
its protection or recovery, including counsel fees, appear to
be these: fairness to the successful litigant, who might otherwise receive no benefit because his recovery might be COllsumed by the expenses; correlative prevention of an unfair
advantage to the others who are entitled to share in the fund
and who should bear their share of the burden of its recovery;
encouragement of the attorney for the successful litigant,
,vho will be more willing to undertake and diligently prosecute proper litigation for the protection or recovery of the
fund if he is assured that he will be promptly and directly
compensated should his efforts be successful" (See also
Sprague v. Ticonic Bank, 307 U.S. 161, 164-167 [59 S.Ct. 777,
83 L.Ed. 1184] ; Hornstein, Cmtrlsel Fce Awards, 69 Harv.
L. Rev. 658, 662-663.) These considerations are not apposite,
however, if the attorney's and his client's ultimate objective
is not to secure or preserve a common fund but to establish
personal adverse interests therein. In such a case fees may not
be awarded. (Scott v. Supcrior Cotlrt, 208 Cal. 303, 307 [281
P. 55] ; Stratton v. City of Long Beq.ch, 188 CalApp.2d 761,
769, 771 [11 CalRptr. 8] ; Hobbs v. McLean,117 U.S. 567,
581-582 [6 S.Ot. 870, 29 L.Ed. 940]; McCormick v. Elsca,
107 Va. 472 [59 S.E. 411, 412-413] ; see also State ex rel
Ebke v. Board of Eclttcation{1l Lands «f7 Funds, 159 Neb.
79 [65 N.W.2d 392, 402]; M~'ller v. Kehoe, 107 Cal 340,
343-344 [40 P. 485] ; Note, 49 A.L.R. 1149, 1159-1161.) Litigation so motivated caUs for no added incentive in the form
of fees from the common fund should the ultimate objective
fail. [2] Moreover, to allow them in such a case merely
because the attorney's services have benefited the class to
whom the fund belonged would place his interests in conflict
with those of his client. An attorney retained to recover or
protect a common fund so that it would be available when
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and if his client could cstablish an adverse right thereto migllt
be induced to forsake his client's interest in the hope of
securing more substantial fees from the common fund. Thus,
if the evidence supports the trial court's finding that peti.tioner's and Mrs. Swart's purpose in intervening was to defeat
both the state's and the city's interests, the judgment must be
affirmed even though their ultimate objectivc was not achieved
and petitioner's services were therefore of benefit to the state.
[3] In 1939 Mrs. Swart filed an application with the
United States Land Office to secure an oil and gas lease of
640 acres of submerged land pursuant to the federal Mineral
Lands Leasing Act of February 25, 1920, as amended (30
U.S.C.A. §§ 181 et seq.). At about the same time Earl G.
Sinclair and Lauren D. Cherry filed a similar application for
a lease of an adjacent 640-acre parcel. These parcels were
part of the submerged lands granted to the city by the state
in 1911 from which the city is and has been producing oil and
gas. In 1947 the United States Supreme Court decided that the
United States and not the State of California had paramount
rights in the marginal seas bordering the state including full
dominion over mineral resources. (United States v. California,
332 U.S. 19 [67 8.Ct. 1658, 91 L.Ed. 1889].) In 1948 the
Department of the Interior rejected the Swart and SinclairCherry applications, and the applicants brought actions in
the District of Columbia against Secretary of the Interior
Krug to compel him to grant their applications.
In 1948 Mrs. Swart transferred her application to the Alma
Petroleum Corporation, and Sinclair and Cherry transferred
their application to the Cherry Petroleum Corporation. These
applications were the only assets of the respective corporations.
Petitioner purchased several shares of Cherry Petroleum stock
and received about 25 shares of Alma Petroleum stock, apparently for services rendered to Mrs. Swart, and he became an
ofticer and director of both corporations. He was aware of
the Washington litigation, which was being conducted by an
attorney with whom he shared oftices and Washington counsel.
The Washington actions were dismissed and refiled against
Secretary of Interior Chapman, Secretary Krug's successor,
in 1951.
In 1952 the Washington actions were placed off calendar
pending decision by the United States Supreme Court of the
boundary between inland waters and the marginal seas along
the California coast. The following year Congress enacted the
Submerged Lands Act of 1953 (43 U.S.C.A. §§ 1301 et seq.)
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quitclaiming the three-mile belt of submerged lands to the
State of California and to those entitled thereto under California law. Section 8 of the act provided, however, that it did
not affect rights in submerged lands that had previously been
. acquircd under any law of the United States. In 1954 in
Justheim v. McKay, 123 F.Supp. 560, the United States District Court of the District of Columbia pointed out that this
provision would protect any rights that applicants for federal
leases might have in the submerged lands of the United States,
but it held that the Mineral Lands Leasing Act of February
25, 1920 did not apply to submerged lands. In January 1956
this holding was affirmed by the United States Court of
Appeals (Justhcim v. McKay, 229 F.2d 29) and in May the
United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. (Jttsthcim v.
McKay, 351 U.S. 933 [76 S.Ct. 789, 100 L.Ed. 1461].) In
August the Swart and Cherry-Sinclair actions were dismissed
pursuant to stipulation on the basis of the decision in the
Justheim case.
Petitioner filed Mrs. Swart's complaint in intervention in
the Mallon ease in 1953 and argued the appeal before this
court in 1954. After our decision in 1955, he resisted the
petition for rehearing and continued to represent the state's
interest in subsequent proceeding in the Mallon case until
after the settlement of the controversy between the city and
state pursuant to the 1956 legislation.
From the foregoing evidence the trial court could reasonably infer, as it did, that "The ultimate objective of petitioner
. . . [and Mrs. Swart] was to deprive the City of Long Beach
and the State of California of all title to and interest in the
oil and gas contained in the Long Beach submerged lands
covered by the respective federal leasing applications held by
Alma Petroleum Corporation and Cherry Petroleum Corporation and to establish said corporations' ownership of the oil
and gas revenues therefrom. The intervention of . . . [Mrs.
Swart and petitioner) was intended by [them] ... as a step
to accomplish said objective, the real purpose thereof being
to prevent expenditure of oil and dry gas revenues derived by
the City of Long Beach from the submerged lands covered by
said mineral leasing applications until such time as said applications were granted and leases issued thereon by the Secretary of the Interior."
[ 4] Petitioner contends, however, that in the light of
other evidence in the record no inference can be drawn from
the mere pendency of the Washington litigation that he and
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Mrs. Swart were still seeking to establish personal interests
in the oil and gas revenues at the time she intervened in the
Mallon case. Thus, petitioner testified that he concluded and
so advised Mrs. Swart that any federal rights were gone
following the Republican victory in the election of 1952,
which paved the way for the return of the submerged lands to
the states the following year. He then threw away his Alma
Petroleum stock and wrote off his Cherry Petroleum stock
as a total loss on his income tax return. Mrs. Swart took no
action to prosecute her Wa,>hington action after it was put
off calendar in 1952, and at no time did petitioner take part
in the Washington litigation. Had he believed that there was
any chance of establishing the federal rights after the submerged lands were returned to the state, he contends that it
would have been totally out of character for him, who showed
such tenacity in prosecuting the Mallon case, to allow his
interests in the federal applications to be handled by others
and ultimately to be defeated in the Justheim case, with which
he had no connection. Moreover, he asserts that had he
wished to preserve the oil and gas revenues intact, he would
not have advanced the contention that they had been released
to the state.
It is true that the evidence would support a finding that
petitioner and Mrs. Swart had abandoned the federal claims
before the intervention in the Mallon case and that they
entered that case solely for the purpose of insuring that the
oil and gas revenue should be lawfully expended. It was for
the trial court, however, to resolve conflicting inferences and
determine the weight that should be given to petitioner's
disclaimer of any adverse interest. Unfortunately much evidence of Mrs. Swart's and petitioner's objectives was unavailable. Mrs. Swart was too senile to appear as a witness, and
ller husband could shed no light on the advice petitioner had
given her. Petitioner's office associate who was cocounsel of
record in the Mallon case and cocounsel with "\Vashington
attorneys in the Swart and Cherry-Sinclair Washington litigation died suddenly before being called to testify.
There was testimony, however, that in 1955 petitioner had
stated to the witness that in his opinion the United States
was the owner of the lands from which the oil and gas revenues were derived, and it is significant that from 1949 to
1951 petitioner, together with the counsel who had filed the
"\Vashingtoll actions, prosecuted the case of Trickey v. City of
Long Beach, 101 Cal.App.2d 871 [226 P.2d 694], to enjoin the
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city from spending dry-gas revenues for nontrust purposes.
At that time petitioner had not concluded that the federal
claims were valueless, and in view of the saving clause for
federal rights included in the Submerged Lands Act of 1953,
the trial court could reasonably infer that petitioner did not
consider that act conclusive. It may be that the chance of
establishing the federal claims appeared remote, but the stakes
were tremendous. Petitioner had made an intensive study of
the law governing the tide and submerged lands, he was
familiar with the pleadings in the Swart and Cherry-Sinclair
Washington actions and he had studied the records of the
United States Supreme Court in the proceedings between
the United States and California. It was only after the decision in the Justheim case that the Swart and Cherry-Sinclair
actions were dismissed, and there is no compelling evidence
that they had theretofore been abandoned. The trial court
was fully justified in concluding that they had not been abandoned when petitioner prosecuted Mrs. Swart's intervention
in the Mallon case and that the purpose of intervention was
to protect the value of the federal claims when and if they
should be established.
[6 ] P~titioner contends that the trial court. committed
prejudicial error in excluding evidence of his services before
a committee of the Legislature in working out legislation to
settle the controversy that arose between the city and the
state after the Mallon case was decided. He contends that
this evidence was relevant to prove that his motive throughout
was not to defeat but to protect the state's interest. It is clear
from the record that in excluding this evidence the trial
court was primarily concerned with the extent of services for
which fees could be awarded if the right to fees was established. It had ruled that only services rendered in the Mallon
case itself could be considered in fixing the amount of compensation, and it concluded that services volunteered to the
Legislature to assist in securing the fruits of the Mallon decision for the state could not be compensated. It is true that
petitioner stated that he was offering the evidence not only
on the question of the amount of the fees that should be
awarded but also to establish the equities of his case. He did
not point out, however, the relevance of the evidence to the
issue of his motive. Moreover, since he had attacked the effectiveness of the attorney general's representation of the state's
interest even after the Mallon case was decided and had
contended that the attorney general failed properly to repre-
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sent the state before the committee of the Legislature, the
equities he referred to could easily have been understood to
relate to a right to compensation for all services rendered in
the state's interest whether within or outside of the framework of the Mallon ease. Even if the trial court erred in
failing to see the relevance of the excluded evidence to the
issue of petitioner's motive or that it was offered on tlIat issue,
the error was not prejudicial. There was abundant evidence
in the record that petitioner continued to champion the state '8
interest in the Mallon case itself following this court's decision
therein, and evidence of similar activity before the Legislature
would have been largely cumulative. Under these circumstances it is not reasonably probable that had the trial court
admitted the offered evidence, it would have resolved the
question of petitioner's motive differently than it did .
. The judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Schauer, J., McComb, J., Peters, J., White,
J., and Dooling, J., concurred.
Appellant's petition for a rehearing was denied August
16,1961.

